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Private law, public landscape: troubling the grid
Abstract
Let me tell you a story about the relationship between law and landscape. This story has a protagonist (a
lawyer) and a setting (landscape). The lawyer comes to the landscape laden with predispositions,
viewpoints, culture. Most importantly, the lawyer stands before the landscape after having made two
decisive, albeit difficult decisions. The first decision was to become a lawyer; the second, to orient herself,
or to be oriented, before a particular landscape. Would it be a wild, uncultivated scene or an industrial
centre? Would it be a slum or an affluent suburb? Would it be a business centre or a rural backwater?
These decisions, in combination with the supposedly pre-determined properties of the personal, are
understood to set the lawyer upon a particular path.
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Private law, public landscape:
troubling the grid
Fleur E Johns
The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled
Our vision is continually active, continually holding things in a circle around
itself, constituting what is present to us as we are
The eye of the other
combines with our own eye to make it fully credible that we are part of the
visible world (Berger 1972: 7, 9).

1

Introduction

Let me tell you a story about the relationship between law and landscape.
This story has a protagonist (a lawyer) and a setting (landscape). The
lawyer comes to the landscape laden with predispositions, viewpoints,
culture. Most importantly, the lawyer stands before the landscape after
having made two decisive, albeit difficult decisions. The first decision
was to become a lawyer; the second, to orient herself, or to be oriented,
before a particular landscape. Would it be a wild, uncultivated scene or
an industrial centre? Would it be a slum or an affluent suburb? Would it
be a business centre or a rural backwater? These decisions, in
combination with the supposedly pre-determined properties of the
personal, are understood to set the lawyer upon a particular path.
From then on, having selected her landscape, the lawyers task is to
navigate that terrain along her assigned, lawyerly path. The landscape
unfolds before her in stages, like a Poussin painting. It is a scene of
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ribald curves and slippery slopes. For the lawyer, it is scarred only by
the linear route of the law. Now the laws path turns right, now left
(these days, the lawyer steers a course as close to the centre of the path
as possible). She wonders occasionally: Who built this path? What
tectonic shifts, what anonymous human labours shaped this landscape
through which I travel? Distracted, she stumbles, then quickly reminds
herself to stay the course.
The path continues. At one point, it falls behind a rise and the
lawyer finds herself in a space decreed private. At another point, the
path opens into a public square. In each of these spaces, the role of the
lawyer is to prune the pathway and gather findings. She must cultivate
the opportunities presented by the landscape and respond to its
challenges and threats. The path itself  the path of the law  strikes
her as relatively narrow. From it, the lawyer gazes longingly at the open
planes of the political, the bountiful fields of the economic, the crazed
surfaces of the cultural and the serene oases of the natural. It is from
these that she draws the inspiration to continue the journey. It is from
the landscape that opportunities, questions and resources issue forth.
It is the landscape that will decide the allocation of the fruits of her
labours, and how bountiful they will be. The landscape tells her who
she is and who she should become. The law merely lays out the path:
the path between being and becoming.
Now, let me tell a different story about the relationship between law
and landscape. Imagine our lawyer protagonist not as a viewer, nor as a
pedestrian. Imagine her sodden, embedded, immersed. Picture the lawyer
dragging her feet from glutinous mud and struggling to find a foothold
 to mark the spot that says law. Think of the building of her path as
a sweaty, strenuous, unfinished work on which she labours alongside
many. This spot, she says, this spot will be sacred and I will call it my
own. Here, I will anchor the law. But then as she places her boot, it
touches not field but flesh: she stands on moving ground, the ground
of another. Here, she says, from this place I can see ahead; now I
have a clear line of vision. But the line she draws is a circle; her progress
is a return. Ahah, she says, I am standing now at the starting point;
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this is the place from which we may begin; this is the commonplace.
But the commonplace is already scored and cross-hatched. It bears the
markings of others who have been before and arrows that point
elsewhere.
**********************
Prevailing accounts of the relationship between law and its landscapes
 physical, social and ideational  tend, I argue, towards the first,
more Poussin-esque of these allegorical scenes. The scholarship of
legal geography has tended to cast law as mediating a perpetual tugof-war between the private and the public in spatial terms (see, for
example, Blomley et al 2001). In some versions of this scholarship, the
private is in ascendance; in others, the public is gaining the upper
hand. In each case, law is depicted in the foreground, responding to
technological, economic, social and political developments cast into
the background as social fact or otherwise.
According to some late 20th century writings, for instance, the
expanding reach of privatopia combined with the demise of the social
welfare state has led to the gradual historical demise of public man and
the landscapes in which he flourished (Blakeley & Snyder 1997,
McKenzie 1996, Sennett 1977). Today, such accounts maintain, a
bountiful public is in retreat as borders tighten, possibilities for protest
contract, and large urban assemblages from Berlin to New York are
sapped of tax revenue (Larsen 1999). Law is understood to have
contributed to this degradation of the public by promoting the
naturalness of landscapes averse to social, racial, political and economic
miscegenation (Frug 1999: 2653). Legal efforts to preserve and prioritise
the private (pastoral expanses, suburban vistas, isolated tax pools and
so forth) have, it is said, hollowed out the state. There is a sense in such
accounts that the momentum of a prevailing swing to the private is both
driving and exceeding the law.
Elsewhere, however, contemporary scholarship offers a directly
contrary account, casting a natural state of privacy, calm and security
in a receding mode. The synthetic conditions of a disorderly, technocratic
public encroach at ever-increasing speed. Law is either powerless to
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stop this encroachment, or is deliberately or unwittingly contributing
to it. Free trade, for instance, imperils private, individualised notions of
the neighbourly and the small-scale (Gillespie 2001, Howse & Trebilcock
1997). Walls  virtual and residential  prove permeable, laws labours
notwithstanding, and privacy is under siege (Edwards 2003, Bennett &
Raab 2003). Again, law is cast at once as respondent, rogue, and redeemer,
with its performance in each role proving somehow insufficient. In this
case, it is the public or the governmental that is seen to be both impelling
the law and overwhelming it.
Socio-legal narratives of both these sorts are inclined to associate
the physical integrity of space (whether public square or private cloister)
with an elusive, retreating harmony. Both versions of the scholarship
paraphrased above import a sense that law stands at a distance from a
relatively discrete, non-legal background by which it is both informed
and inspired. It is the thesis of this article that law and legal scholarship
in common law jurisdictions maintain this sense of distance and integrity
in part by adherence to a perspectival grid. The common law, this article
will go on to argue, is imbued with a perspectival preoccupation in its
reading of physical and social landscapes. That preoccupation  in
law as in art  both enables and impedes its vision.
Seeking (momentarily) to scramble this perspectival vision, this article
scrutinises its construction and effects through a focus on private law.
In so doing, this article seeks to invert a further foreground/background
dynamic  namely, that between private law, on one hand, and public
policy on the other. The inquiry that follows emphasises the role that
private law plays in the sorts of distributions and discriminations that
are most frequently attributed to extra-juridical (background)
determinants: government policy, corporate purchasing power or
consumer choice. Instead, it will be argued here that distributive effects
may be attributed to the structural or stylistic features of private law
itself. These features are neither individually chosen in any
determinative sense, nor beyond legal question. A perspectival
orientation facilitates private laws production of a spatial grid to which
that law anchors itself, and from which it derives both its rational
justification and its reformist goals. Perspective thus shapes the law
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and influences the direction of legal scholarship and law reform. It does
so, moreover, in a way that is itself cast into the background of legal
inquiry. This can be seen in the mundane and apparently settled legal
terrain of private property ownership. In particular, it can be seen in the
common law on the tort of nuisance.
Through a selective critique of (primarily Anglo-Australian) private
nuisance law, this article will probe common lawyers habitual experience
of negotiating the social-physical landscape. As suggested above, that
habitual experience involves charting a course by, and laying a mark
upon, a pre-existing (albeit ever-changing) background of
predisposition, potential and prejudice. In place of this experience, this
article seeks to generate a sense of law always still at work in producing
its own background: placing and replacing those markers by which the
law orients and exonerates itself. More specifically, this article seeks to
counter the notion of private property as settled ground: a space always
already in the background to law reform debates; pre-negotiated and
emptied of regulatory opportunity (on negotiating the non-negotiable,
see Derrida 2002: 13, 1140). In analysing the tort law of nuisance for
its perspectival orientation, law may be glimpsed in a different relation
to landscape to that which the perspectival grid ordinarily dictates.
With these objectives in view, Part 2 of this article will provide a
brief explanation of common law principles concerning the tort of private
nuisance. It will draw from English and Australian authorities to outline
the basic principles of private nuisance, ignoring, for purposes of this
article, jurisdictionally specific details and divergences. In view of the
mismatched historical medley that comprises the law of nuisance across
common law jurisdictions, this will necessarily be an approximate and
incomplete account.
Part 3 will then explain this articles claim that the tort of nuisance is
informed by a perspectival vision that structures its reading of social
and physical landscapes. Drawing upon English, Australian and, to a
lesser extent, US, Canadian and New Zealand authorities, illustrations
will be given of how the common law of private nuisance enshrines a
distinctly perspectival orientation. Once again, this discussion will
downplay doctrinal variations across common law jurisdictions.
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Finally, in light of the preceding study, Part 4 will tender the following
contention. The perspectival grid is a crucial element to be engaged in
seeking to contest the current state of law-landscape relations in the
common law, and the blindspots and distributive injustices to which
those relations contribute. This article will close with a brief rumination
on prospects for opening laws perspectival orientation to negotiation,
within the law of private nuisance and elsewhere.

2

The common law of private nuisance:
an overview

In order to scrutinise the common law of private nuisance for its
perspectival predisposition, it is important first to grasp the basic tenets
to which that law subscribes. In so doing, however, it is important to
recognise that the complexity of nuisance law across the common law
world far surpasses the following description. As one commentator has
observed, [t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
law than that which surrounds the word nuisance (Keeton et al 1984:
618).
In brief, a common law action for private nuisance arises from
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. More
precisely, it arises from unreasonable interference with proprietary rights
recognised as sufficient to found a cause of action in private nuisance.
In other words, for a plaintiff to succeed in an action for private nuisance,
the plaintiff must establish that: (a) the plaintiff has a requisite proprietary
interest; and (b) the defendant has, by action or inaction, interfered
with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of that proprietary interest, which
interference is unreasonable. The defendant may, in defence, either
disprove one of the foregoing elements or contend that the nuisance
has been rendered lawful by prescription or by statutory authorisation
(Trindade & Cane 1999: 6404, Fleming 1998: 48892, Deakin et al 2003:
47984, Heuston & Buckley 1996: 706). Let us now briefly consider
each of the requisite elements of the tort.
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A

Proprietary interest

In the 1997 case of Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd; Hunter v. London
Docklands Corporation (hereinafter Hunter), Lord Goff of the English
House of Lords stated that it has for many years been regarded as
settled law that a person who has no right in the land cannot sue in
private nuisance (Hunter: 689). Private nuisance is intended to protect
the freeholder, the tenant, the licensee with exclusive possession, and/
or a party whose reversionary interest is damaged by the nuisance in
question (Hunter: 692). In English law, exclusive de facto possession of
affected land may also suffice to establish a right to sue for private
nuisance (Foster v Warblington Urban District Council, Paxhaven
Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General, Hunter: 688). Based on the 1976
authority of Oldham v Lawson (No 1), and the Restatement (2nd) of the
Law of Torts, respectively, this would appear to be the position in
Australian and US law as well.
B

Unreasonable interference

As a tort to property, the traditional realm of private nuisance was, in
the words of one commentator, the stinking privy, the urban hog-sty,
the fouled or diverted stream, [and] the polluting chimney (Brenner
1975: 403). Faced with production of the pungent or the poisonous, the
law of private nuisance has historically dr[awn] the line around free
use and enjoyment of land at that point where anothers use and
enjoyment were impaired (Brenner 1975: 404). While the standards for
adjudging actionable impairment might once have been described as
rural, agricultural and conservative, the range of behaviours that have
been held to amount to unreasonable interference with anothers use
and enjoyment of land are now as varied as the circumstances of their
invocation (Brenner 1975: 404, Goldman v Hargrave: 992, SedleighDenfield v OCallaghan: 364).
In English and Australian courts, noise, fumes, odours, vibrations,
glare, dust, golf balls have all been found to constitute a nuisance
actionable by those in possession of property in close proximity to the
property from which they emanate. Interference emanating from one
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partys property may pose the risk of physical harm or it may be
productive of sensible, personal discomfort consisting of the personal
inconvenience and interference with ones enjoyment, ones quiet, ones
personal freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the
senses or the nerves (St Helens Smelting Company v Tipping: 1486).
Significantly, however, such interference need not take the form of
physical entry onto property. Direct interferences fall under the rubric
of trespass to land, rather than the tort of nuisance (Deakin et al 2003:
44454, Heuston & Buckley 1996: 4052).
The test that courts apply to an alleged nuisance is one of
reasonableness. An interference with anothers use and enjoyment of
land will be judged unreasonable (and therefore actionable) where it
exceeds the level of tolerance  give and take; live and let live  that
the law expects of people living in a populous society (Bamford v
Turnley: 834). This standard is not to be set by the most fastidious or
sensitive or those prone to dainty modes and habits of living. Rather,
it is to be determined (one oft-cited 1851 authority stated) according to
plain and sober and simple notions among the
people (Walter v
Selfe: 322, adopted in Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead). Moreover,
that which reasonableness is understood to require will depend upon
the locality in which this assessment is to be made. Conduct that would
be adjudged an actionable nuisance in an affluent, quiet, residential
neighbourhood will not necessarily amount to such in a working class,
industrial area (Sturges v Bridgman: 865, comparing Belgravia and
Bermondsey, Bamford v Turnley: 79, comparing Grosvenor Square and
Smithfield Market). The duration, timing and gravity of the interference
will also be relevant to the assessment of an alleged nuisance, as may
the purpose or utility of the activity in question (Trindade & Cane 1999:
6324, Fleming 1998: 46498, Deakin et al 2003: 4656, 483, Heuston &
Buckley 1996: 556).
The zoning function of private nuisance law  its function of
allocating activities to appropriate areas through the characterisation
of (un)reasonable behaviour in a manner particular to locality  has
been recognised (Brenner 1975: 406). Nevertheless, judicial accounts of
nuisance law tend to deflect attention away from its discretionary power
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to shape, rank and divide contemporary urban and suburban landscapes.
Nuisance laws classifications of reasonable and unreasonable
behaviours are not, it is said, attributable to the vagaries of aesthetic or
value judgment, whether on the part of the plaintiffs or that of the
judiciary (McVittie v Bolton Corp: 283, Bathurst City Council v Saban
(No 2): 206, Coventry City Council v Cartwright). Nor, the courts have
frequently claimed, should these classifications be read as ventures in
social engineering. Rather, nuisance law is said both to arise from, and
be constrained by, that enduring, unarguable freedom consequent upon
the ownership or lawful possession of property:
[T]he English common law allows the rights of a landowner to build as he
[sic] pleases to be restricted only in carefully limited cases [W]e have a
rule of common law which, absent easements, entitles an owner of land to
build what he likes on his land. It has stood for many centuries (Hunter:
710).

Common law doctrines of private nuisance thus confirm the authority
of property holders over the land to which their interest corresponds.
Yet the law in this area also confers power upon such interest-holders
to shape the landscape surrounding their properties by means other
than acquisition. Through recourse to nuisance law, such interestholders enjoy capacity legally to suppress behaviour impinging directly
or indirectly upon their normality, thereby possessing authority to shape
the landscape beyond the bounds of their property. The normality of
the owner or other party deemed in control of land is quite literally
grounded in the terrain of their proprietary interest, and extended
outwards from that ground. The effect of this is to insulate such persons
power and preferences from the many contending claims and perceptions
that might be put forward by those who pass through or share their
landscape. The property holders version of the reasonable may not be
challenged by anyone other than a neighbouring property holder. In
this respect, perspective plays a vital constitutive and validating role.
To what perspective does the foregoing claim refer? The reference
is to the modern representational scheme of linear perspective, a brief
introduction to which now follows.
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3
A

Perspective in private nuisance law

On perspective

Conventional accounts of perspective in the modern period focus on
perspectiva artificialis (as opposed to the perspectiva naturalis or
communis of medieval texts)  a perspectival scheme linked to the
scientific innovations of the Renaissance insofar as it purported to
subject representation to the laws of optics. Such accounts tend also to
focus on the innovations of a few named individuals: archetypal heroes
of modernity. According to the avatars of history wrote Hubert Damisch,
no sooner had Leone-Battista Alberti arrived in Florence in 1434 than
he undertook to write Della pittura, his art of painting in three books,
the first of which includes, under the heading rudimenta, an exposition
of what we might call the princeps of rational perspective construction
and rational more geometrico (1994: 59). Alongside Alberti stands Filipo
di Ser Brunellescho (Brunelleschi) to whom the 1436 Italian edition of
Della pittura was dedicated (1994: 59). Brunelleschi, Damisch observed,
is supposed to have put this perspective into practice, to have put it
into action (1994: 67). So begins the standard story of the rise of modern
perspective.
In Albertis Della pittura, an excellent method was set out for
ensuring that objects in a painting appear like real objects: a method
that depended upon such objects stand[ing] to each other in a
determined relationship (1991: 56). That relationship relied, in turn, upon
an anticipated distance between the eye of the spectator and the picture
plane. Erwin Panofsky described the perspectival view of space
invented at this time as a transform[ation] of [t]he material surface
onto which individual figures or objects are drawn into a window
through which a spatial continuum is seen (1991: 27). In a picture
constructed this way, Panofsky explains, the following laws are valid.
First, all perpendiculars or orthogonals meet at the so-called central
vanishing point, which is determined by the perpendicular drawn from
the eye to the picture plane. Second, all parallels, in whatever direction
they lie, have a common vanishing point Finally, equal dimensions
diminish progressively as they recede in space, so that any portion of
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the picture  assuming that the location of the eye is known  is
calculable from the preceding or following portion (1991: 28).
The effect of these laws of perspective is, as Panofsky noted, to
create distance between human beings and things
but then in turn
[to] abolish this distance by, in a sense, drawing this world of things, an
autonomous world confronting the individual, into the eye for these
rules refer to the psychological and physical conditions of the visual
impression, and the way they take effect is determined by the freely
chosen position of a subjective point of view (1991: 67). Damisch
elaborated further on the latter of these two effects  the role of
perspective in both constituting and referencing a discrete,
individualised human subjectivity identified with the point of view:
[Perspectives] function seems to correspond perfectly to the function
which is that of language, myth, and art, to say nothing of science: a function by no means specular, or passive, but rather constitutive, within the
register of representation, of the order and even the meaning of things
[i]ncluding the synthetic function identifiable with the I: the I which
in this capacity must be inscribed, from the beginning, within the point of
view, an idea that necessarily refers us back to that of the subject
(1994: 910).

Perspectives installation of the subject, Damisch demonstrated,
always also entails the organisation of space according to notions of
proximity to, and distance from, that subject  the demarcation of a
here and a there and the delineation of particular ways of moving
between them:
Perspective is not a code, but it has this in common with language, that
in and by itself it institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a
point, a factor analogous to the subject or person in language, always
posited in relation to a here or there, accruing all the possibilities for
movement from one position to another that this entails (1994: 53).

Damisch, however, disavowed the notion that perspective reduces
the viewing subject to a kind of cyclops, and obliges the eye to remain
at one fixed, indivisible point (1994: 35). Rather, perspectival orientation
around the gaze entails capture in, and movement through, a double
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vision: the vision of the one to whose gaze the image is referable and a
complementary vision, or another vision whereby the viewing subject
is seen from without as another would see [him/her], installed in the
midst of the visible, in the process of considering it from a certain spot
(Damisch 1994: 46, quoting Merleau-Ponty 1968: 134). Perspective
provides a means of staging this capture and of playing it out in a
reflective mode (Damisch 1994: 46).
In these effects, the influence of perspectival orientation extends
well beyond the realm of pictorial representation and visual experience.
Perspective works not only, as Albertis text would suggest, on painting
(Cosgrove 1985). Rather, as the ground-breaking work of Hubert Damisch
highlighted:
To say that our culture has been and continues to be shaped, informed, and
programmed at bedrock level by the perspective paradigm is more than
mere wordplay Perspective has become so completely integrated into
our knowledge, at the most implicit or unconscious level, that today we
must turn to another kind of knowledge, erudite knowledge, and embark on
an anamnestic project designed to recover it from the technological oblivion
into which it has been plunged by ideology (Damisch 1994: 52).

Indeed, the programming effects of perspective are often, Damisch
observed, precisely not visible, notwithstanding their rootedness in
the visual:
As a paradigm or regulatory structure, perspective is sometimes in operation
precisely where one least expects it, where its intervention is least
visible its function extends [to] providing a network of indexes that
constitutes the equivalent of an expressive apparatus or sentence structure
(1994: 25).

This paradigmatic structure is borne out in the jurisprudence of
private nuisance at common law.
B

The landscape of private nuisance law

In assessing behaviour by reference to the outlook of an aggrieved
property holder, nuisance law echoes perspectives orientation around
an individual viewing subject. Nuisance law similarly constructs an
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autonomous world of things and actions and draws this into a singular
observational standpoint. From that standpoint, the world recedes
towards a vanishing point in an even progression, such that the
distancing of one thing from another within the picture plane is rendered
unavoidable. The eye may only bridge that distance via predetermined,
navigable paths: by tracing those parallels that organise and fix the
perspectival sense of place so that any portion of the picture
is
calculable from the preceding or following portion (Panofsky 1991: 28).
One may discern such a perspectival structure in the 1981 English
case of Laws v Florinplace Ltd (hereinafter Laws). The plaintiffs in
Laws, who were residents of Longmoore Street, Pimlico, in London,
sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the continued operation
of a shop selling pornographic magazines, books and videos. That
injunction was granted upon a finding that there was at least a triable
issue that the operation of a sex shop amounted to such an affront to
the reasonable susceptibilities of ordinary men and women that it
constituted an interference with the reasonable domestic enjoyment of
[the plaintiffs] property (Laws: 6667). Vinelott J set the scene as follows:
Longmoore Street is a residential street in Pimlico, about a quarter of a mile
or a little more from Victoria Station. It bisects a busy road, Wilton Road,
which runs south-east from the station. If a visitor continues south-east
down Wilton Road after the intersection with Longmoore Street he will
reach, after a distance of some fifty to a hundred yards, another main road,
Warwick Way, which again crosses and marks the end of Wilton Road.
Retracing his footsteps and crossing again the intersection with Longmoore
Street he will reach after a longer distance, some three or four hundred
yards, another intersection called Gillingham Street. The part of Wilton
Road which lies between Gillingham Street and Longmoore Street consists
almost wholly of commercial properties of one kind or another, which
serve to some extent the casual trade of people coming to and from the
station
But the part of Longmoore Street which lies to the south-west
side of Wilton Road is almost wholly residential. The houses are small
terrace houses, built a hundred years ago for artisans (Laws: 666).

By so framing the area under consideration, Vinelott J went a
considerable way towards deciding the outcome of Laws, even before
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his evaluation of the parties substantive arguments got underway. For
the character of the area was critical to the determination of what
amounted to reasonable enjoyment of property in the vicinity:
Mr Laws, a barrister who lives there and who is the first-named plaintiff,
has described this area, that is, the bottom half of Longmoore Street and the
part of Wilton Road which lies between Longmoore Street and Warwick
Way, as having a marked and attractive village atmosphere. That description
is disputed by the defendants, who point to the proximity of Victoria
Station, to the commercial nature of the part of Wilton Road which lies
between Longmoore Street and Victoria Station, and more particularly to
the existence on the north-east side of Wilton Road, near the intersection of
Gillingham Street, of a bookshop described as an adult bookshop and to
the existence on the other side of Gillingham Street of a cinema which, it is
said, displays films of the kind often described as soft pornography and
of a shop described as a sex shop (Laws: 667).

By envisaging the area from the perspective of a single pedestrian,
beginning at the intersection of Longmoore Street and Wilton Road
and walking first south-east and north-west along Wilton Road, and
then south-west down Longmoore Street, Vinelott J rendered natural a
focus on the bottom half of Longmoore Street, and its distinction from
the rest of the area described. Had the imagined spectator been given a
birds eye view, for instance, it might have seemed unreasonable to
characterise the bottom half of Longmoore Street and the part of Wilton
Road which lies between Longmoore Street and Warwick Way, as
distinct from the surrounding area. Similarly, had this hypothetical viewer
not begun his/her perambulations on the busy thoroughfare of Wilton
Road, the above-mentioned area might have not seemed so quiet and
village-like in comparison. Vinelott Js positioning of the eye in this
case thus established the perspectival sentence structure (per Damisch)
through which the landscape under survey was comprehended. Vinelott
Js selection of this point of view ensured that the small terrace houses
of Longmoore Street came to comprise a here and the commercial
properties, adult bookshop, cinema and sex shop of Wilton Road
comprised a there, with the rights of the respective parties calibrated
accordingly.
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By fashioning the landscape in this way, the people who frequented
it were likewise divided. They became, respectively, the decent and the
indecent, with each of the two constituencies occupying a relatively
discrete location within the spatial continuum. Their separation was
rendered as natural and proper, in this account, as a perspectival
relationship between the near and the far. Accordingly, Vinelott J accepted
the following submissions from the plaintiffs:
Counsel for the plaintiffs put his case on two broad grounds. First, he
submitted that the existence of a business of this kind, selling hard
pornography, and selling it in such a way that the nature of the business
would be apparent to those living in or visiting the area, is itself a nuisance,
because the instinctive repugnance that would be felt by ordinary decent
men and women, and the embarrassment that would be felt by visitors,
would in itself constitute a material and unreasonable interference with the
comfort and enjoyment of their property. Second, he said that the nature of
the business was such that the plaintiffs are justified in fearing that it may
become a plague spot, attracting undesirable customers, and with them
others, such as prostitutes, who trade on those customers, and in turn,
criminals trading on the prostitutes. Further, some of the customers, it is
suggested, may be of a kind who might molest young girls with indecent
suggestions (Laws: 667).

C

The law and its backgrounds (part I): economics

Even where courts do not engage so explicitly in setting out the visual
panorama of a case, it is possible to discern certain routine operations
by which a particular decision in one or other case is made to appear
logically defensible, sometimes even unavoidable. These are operations
in which perspectival structure is at work. That is, these operations
betray an unthinking adherence to a particular viewpoint and a
prescribed set of spatial relations flowing from that viewpoint. One
such operation involves the distancing of law from the sphere of
economics (specifically, the economics of proprietary value). A second
entails the distancing of law from the sphere of the aesthetic (the realm
of personal idiosyncrasy or mere taste).
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The first of these operations is discernible in the requirement that
legal constraint under the doctrine of private nuisance be justified by
reference to injury to a proprietary interest. Injury, in this context, is
understood as a loss in the value of that property, whether its capital
value or its amenity value (Hunter: 696). A nuisance will only be
actionable where such a decline in property value is shown to arise
from the alleged tortfeasors unreasonable interference (see, for example,
St Pierre v Ontario). An oft-cited statement to this effect is that of the
Lord Chancellor in St Helens Smelting Company v Tipping:
If a man lives in a street where there are numerous shops, and a shop is
opened next door to him, which is carried on in a fair and reasonable way, he
has no ground for complaint, because to himself individually there may
arise much discomfort from the trade carried on in that shop. But when an
occupation is carried on by one person in the neighbourhood of another,
and the result of that trade, or occupation, or business, is a material injury
to property, then there unquestionably arises a very different consideration.
I think, my Lords, that in a case of that description, the submission which
is required from persons living in society to that amount of discomfort
which may be necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the trade of
their neighbours, would not apply to circumstances the immediate result of
which is sensible injury to the value of the property (emphasis added) (St
Helens: 650).

Framing nuisance in these terms collapses assessment of the parties
contending claims into the logic of the quantitative: a logic that is
distinguished from and, to a significant degree, insulated from legal
question. The assessment of value and the finding that value has
diminished are understood to be matters of non-legal expertise.
Typically, expert opinions are taken on these issues from real estate
agents and land valuers (see, for example, Hawkes Bay Protein Ltd v
Davidson, Vukelic v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough
Council). This non-legal sphere of quantitative evaluation falls into the
background of the legal dispute and yet remains integral to it. So, in
Hunter, Lord Lloyd commented:
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[T]he essence of private nuisance is easy enough to identify, and it is the
same in all three classes of private nuisance, namely, interference with land
or the enjoyment of land. In the case of [nuisance by encroachment on a
neighbours land or nuisance by direct physical injury to a neighbours
land,] the measure of damages is, as I have said, the diminution in the value
of the land. Exactly the same should be true of [nuisance by interference
with a neighbours quiet enjoyment of his land]. There is no difference of
principle. The effect of smoke from a neighbouring factory is to reduce the
value of the land. There may be no diminution in the market value. But
there will certainly be loss of amenity value so long as the nuisance lasts. If
that be the right approach, then the reduction in amenity value is the same
whether the land is occupied by the family man or the bachelor (Hunter:
696).

The demand that the plaintiff show a decline in property value casts
into the background of a legal dispute the question of how to characterise
and rank the various harms said to have been caused by an alleged
nuisance, and the various ways in which supposedly offensive conduct
may be experienced by different people. Instead, valuation takes place,
at least in part, in a conceptual (or literal) back room to a nuisance claim.
The constituent elements of that valuation are presented to the court as
facts, the strength of which depends more on the perceived veracity
and expertise of the non-legal valuers than upon the substance of the
claims underpinning them.
Recourse to the quantitative background of property value is,
moreover, understood to distance the law from the vagaries of individual
personality or prejudice. Speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Hollick v City of Toronto (while refusing to certify a class action in
nuisance involving 30,000 plaintiffs residing in a 16 square mile area),
Carthy JA observed, for instance:
[C]omplaints of odours are by their nature subjective and thus would have
to be individually assessed in order to ascertain whether emissions from the
respondents site had materially affected each class members enjoyment of
property
(Hollick v City of Toronto: 267).

The invocation of proprietary value, and the anchorage to that value
of a particular legal decision (that is, whether a nuisance is found to
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have arisen), thus circumscribes an inquiry that might otherwise veer
off in a number of directions. Legal inquiry might otherwise include
scrutiny of injury-causing behaviour by virtue of which property
interests had come to rest in the hands of the property holder(s) in
question. It might also involve consideration of the competing claims
of property-holders and non-property-owning occupants alike, and of
the relationships between them. Yet the commodity value of property,
as Marx recognised in the 19th century, exerts a talismanic force that
forestalls such investigations, ranking the property-holders comfort
and interests above all others. By its very nature, recourse to the
commodity (in this case property) blocks examination or disruption of
the social relationships necessary to its production and recognition as
a value-bearing thing (Marx 1919: I: 81).
The invisibility of social relations in the assessment of property
value is evident in nuisance laws inattention to residents or routine
occupants of the property said to have been injured, where those
residents or occupants possess no recognised proprietary interest.
Hunter confirmed, for instance, that private nuisance does not permit
suit by husbands
wives, or partners [of the holder of a proprietary
interest], and their children, and even other relatives living with them
(Hunter: 693). Similarly, in Hunter, Lord Goff refused to contemplate
extending a right of suit in nuisance to the lodger upstairs, or the au
pair girl or resident nurse caring for an invalid who makes her home in
the house while she works [on the property in question]. The extension
of the tort in this way would, Lord Goff opined, transform it from a tort
to land into a tort to the person (Hunter: 693).
It is critical to the law of private nuisance that it concerns a wrong
done to a proprietary right, which right is understood to exist
independently of the sensibilities, status or social circumstances of the
aggrieved person who holds it. However, the sensibilities of an
aggrieved person do form a legitimate basis for a nuisance action when
injury thereto may be expressed as diminished enjoyment of a proprietary
interest. No matter how much a non-property-holding person may suffer
as a result of an interference affecting the property where s/he lives,
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that persons discomfort will fail to register as the basis for a nuisance
action. In contrast, the landowners sensible, personal discomfort is
readily translated into terms of an injury to property, as Lord Hoffmans
reasoning in Hunter demonstrated:
In the case of nuisances productive of sensible personal discomfort, the
action is not for causing discomfort to the person but, as in the case of the
first category, for causing injury to the land. True it is that the land has not
suffered sensible injury, but its utility has been diminished by the existence
of the nuisance. It is for an unlawful threat to the utility of his land that the
possessor or occupier is entitled to an injunction and it is for the diminution
in such utility that he is entitled to compensation (Hunter: 706).

The routine distancing of issues amenable to legal deduction from
questions of proprietary value helps to render non-negotiable this
prioritisation of the sensibilities and sufferings of property holders over
those of other people who live with or near them. This distancing relies
upon a distinctly perspectival outlook. The common law divides the
landscape of a nuisance claim into a series of legal and non-legal planes
and casts that division as an autonomous order of nature. In so doing,
it determines what is proximate (and open to discussion) and what is
remote (and non-negotiable), thereby circumscribing the possibilities
for movement from one position to another (Damisch 1994: 53).
D

The law and its backgrounds (part II): aesthetics

The second operation  in many ways comparable to the first  entails
the separation of questions of taste from questions of law in nuisance
claims (see generally Coletta 1987 and Smith 2000). Taste is, in this
account, the sphere of personality, particularity and instinct. This is a
sphere supposedly saturated with subjectivity. By distancing laws
understanding of propertys ordinary uses and purposes from a sphere
so characterised, those ordinary uses and purposes are stiffened with a
sense of inevitability or commonality. In this way, the suppression of
activities not decreed ordinary is cleansed of partisanship.
This effect was discernible in the Missouri Court of Appeals
determination, in Ness v Albert (hereinafter Ness), that a would-be
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nuisance suit failed to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs in Ness
alleged that the presence of certain rusted objects, pieces of concrete,
parts of old sinks and stoves, and a partially burned house trailer on the
defendants property was unsightly and thus constitute[d] a
nuisance. Dismissing the suit, the court ruled that nuisance actions
could not be based solely on aesthetic considerations. By rejecting a
nuisance suit so framed, the court in Ness reinforced a sense of itself as
a decision-making body free of bias:
Aesthetic considerations are fraught with subjectivity. One mans pleasure
may be another mans perturbation, and vice versa. What is aesthetically
pleasing to one may totally displease another  beauty is in the eye of the
beholder. Judicial forays into such a nebulous area would be chaotic. Any
imaginary good from doing so is far outweighed by the lurking danger of
unduly circumscribing inherent rights of ownership of property and grossly
intimidating their lawful exercise. This court has no inclination to knowingly
infuse the law with such rampant uncertainty (Ness: 2).

The Colorado Court of Appeals sought to adopt a similar posture in
Allison v Smith (hereinafter Allison):
To constitute a nuisance, it is not enough that a thing such as accumulated
debris and rubbish be unsightly or that it offend ones aesthetic sense
(Allison: 794).

That court, however, went on to find that the defendants
accumulation of inoperable automobiles, large rigs, a bulldozer, tons of
scrap metal, pipe, new and used construction materials, drums of
petrochemicals, large amounts of everyday litter and rubbish, and other
obnoxious debris on property adjoining the plaintiffs did amount to
a private nuisance. It did so by setting the question of unreasonableness
apart from the question of mere unsightliness. The court characterised
its decision as one not based on aesthetic sense, but rather based on
a finding that the questioned activity [was] [un]reasonable under all
the surrounding circumstances (Allison: 794). In so doing, the court
relied on the separability of matters of law and reason from matters of
aesthetics, associating itself insistently with the former:
[L]egitimate but unsightly activity such as the accumulation of debris on
land or the operation of a junkyard or auto salvage business may become a
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private nuisance if it is unreasonably operated so as to be unduly offensive
to its neighbors, particularly when it is located in a residential district
(Allison: 794).

In Allison, the courts ability to condemn particular activity as a
nuisance hinged upon its capacity first to identify a singular, ideal
standpoint from which to view that activity, and second to strip that
ideal spectators position of personalising preferences. The locus which
the court attributed to itself for this purpose was that of the property
holder(s) against whom the nuisance was alleged to have been
committed. Were the property holder in question understood to be
viewing the alleged nuisance through the lens of personal aesthetics,
the intolerability of the alleged nuisance would have carried no credence
with the court (as in Ness). Yet where the alleged nuisance was viewed
in such a way as to imbue that viewpoint with the universalising
properties of reason, its offensiveness was understood to merit the
courts censure (as in Allison).
It is the regulatory paradigm of perspective that enables this latter
form of seeing: that lays claim to a shared reality while emanating from
the standpoint of a single viewer. For it is the perspectival grid, with its
parallels converging on a single vanishing point, that draws the singular
into the common, investing the viewing individual with the omnipotence
of the rational or scientific. That which might otherwise appear as a
singular vantage point becomes reality by virtue of its adherence to
certain mathematical laws. The space of the viewing subject is thereby
made to merge seamlessly and methodically with the spatial continuum
of the visible world.
A perspectival mode of representation asks that the outlook and
interests of the private property holder be taken as the outlook and
interests of all by virtue of the formers inherent reasonableness.
Perspective constitutes a tangled melange of public and private from
which neither can be extricated cleanly (on the intermingling of public
and private within property law, see Hennigan 2004: 1978). Private
property gains, through the operation of perspective, an encompassing,
public dimension:
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Just as there is no private property in language, there is none in perception:
the very idea of a perspective contradicts such a notion (Damisch 1994:
34).

Nuisance laws capacity to proscribe certain behaviours with relative impunity on the basis of their unreasonableness thus depends, in
part, on that laws positioning itself at a distance from the realms of
value quantification and personal fancy. On one hand, the legal assessment of nuisance piggybacks on the dryness, impartiality and relative
opacity of property valuation. On the other hand, the legal calculus of
nuisance becomes invested with a sense of neutrality and commonality
by virtue of its distance from the avowedly subjective domain of taste.
By repeated invocation of these distancing relations, courts are inured
to protect landed plaintiffs against sensible personal discomfort without being regarded as prejudicial arbiters among conflicting tastes.
These relations, in turn, depend upon a divided, repetitive ordering of
space that may be traced to the paradigm of perspective. Yet just as
laws perspectival inflection makes possible the legitimising strategies
described above, so the perspectival dimension of nuisance law submerges the property holder in an endless cycle of social exchanges:
exchanges that are bound up in the act of seeing and being seen (Berger
1972: 9). Perspective insulates law, but it also immerses it.
E

The law-landscape connection

Through recourse to planar distinctions such as those discussed in the
preceding section, law champions and safeguards a particular type of
landscape  above all, a divisible landscape. From this landscape, the
law then derives reassurance of its own rectitude. For, despite its
preoccupation with the separation of law from economics and aesthetics,
private nuisance law is heavily invested in the notion that certain
landscapes are determinative of positive ethico-political and/or material
outcomes. The law of private nuisance works affirmatively, for example,
to separate industrial and suburban landscapes (or the division of
workplace from home). In Dennis v Ministry of Defence, for instance,
the fact that the neighbourhood in which the alleged nuisance took
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place was essentially rural meant that the noise caused by the
overflights of military aircraft amounted to a nuisance in such an area.
By implication, had the plaintiffs resided in a landscape where military
and/or industrial operations featured prominently, they might not have
been successful. Nuisance law favours the preservation of single use
landscapes through the designation of the essential character of a
neighbourhood. The conferral of this character is almost invariably
understood to precede the laws own characterisation thereof.
The law of private nuisance thus reinforces the naturalness (or
reasonableness) of a landscape divided into relatively discrete parcels
by reference to ownership, residence, usage and/or occupation.
Nuisance law then justifies its own properties by reference to that
landscape. Landscape, organised into separable planes or units (locality,
street, neighbourhood etc), is understood to lay out the pre-existing
terrain that law must strive to entrench. Yet law is, at the same time,
envisioning and rendering that landscape according to a particular model.
Consider, for example, the emphasis placed on an individual belonging
to a single, confined locality, to the exclusion of others from outside
that locality, in St Helens Smelting Company v Tipping:
If a man lives in a town, it is necessary that he should subject himself to the
consequences of those operations of trade which may be carried on in his
immediate locality, which are actually necessary for trade and commerce,
and also for the enjoyment of property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants
of the town and of the public at large. If a man lives in a street where there
are numerous shops, and a shop is opened next door to him, which is
carried on in a fair and reasonable way, he has no ground for complaint,
because to himself individually there may arise much discomfort from the
trade carried on in that shop. But when an occupation is carried on by one
person in the neighbourhood of another, and the result of that trade, or
occupation, or business, is a material injury to property, then there
unquestionably arises a very different consideration. I think, my Lords,
that in a case of that description, the submission which is required from
persons living in society to that amount of discomfort which may be
necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the trade of their neighbours,
would not apply to circumstances the immediate result of which is sensible
injury to the value of the property (emphasis added) (St Helens: 650).
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Nuisance law thus propagates the expectation that the right
(divisible) landscapes and the right (predictable) laws are
determinatively, if imprecisely linked, even as they are understood to
stand apart from one another. Laws characterised by consistency,
uniformity and navigability are often understood to be conducive to
the realisation of freedom and prosperity: first, by their deference to the
certainty of proprietary interests; second, by their promotion of
reasonableness and hence their suppression of societal conflict. So
too does the law of nuisance favour a landscape in which space is
measurable, divisible and navigable. The one, it seems, engenders the
other. Renderings of law and landscape come to emulate one another,
even as they are understood to be made of entirely different stuff. As
Damisch observed, perspective captures the viewer in a double vision:
looking, while watching herself looking. Likewise, the law looks to the
landscape for the very properties that it seeks to engender in itself.
This self-fulfilling law-landscape relation persists, rather counterintuitively, in reformist literature concerned to disrupt socio-economic
disparity and racial segregation. Margalynne Armstrong, for example,
focuses on the effect of irrational white perceptions about the effect
of black ownership on property values in her discussion of the
entrenchment of spatial segregation in the United States (1998: 1054).
In Armstrongs account, the background of residential segregation is
comprised of social, psychological and economic elements, from which
the law stands apart. Law is called upon to work against and upon this
bias-sodden background. Ideally, law must rid itself of the taint of this
background irrationality in order for the progressive vision of an
integrated spatial continuum to be realised in landscape. Yet law is, in
Armstrongs judgment, ultimately unable to penetrate the background
before which it works:
The problem of white withdrawal from the market due to property owned
by African-Americans and the resulting intransigence of residential
segregation reflects fear, ignorance, and bad faith involving social,
psychological, and economic factors. The past thirty years show us that
law acting alone cannot eliminate segregation. Expanded integration and
African-American market equality will require interdisciplinary strategies
that include, but go beyond, simply legal solutions (1998: 1063).
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In Amstrongs article, as in the work of many progressive legal
scholars, [s]pace is implicitly understood to be the inert context in
which, or the deadened material over which, legal disputes take place
(Ford 1994: 1857 (emphasis in original)). In both respects, this
understanding depends upon the perspectival detachment of foreground
from background.
If a law-landscape connection along a perspectival axis is a feature
of the very juridical common sense that much reformist literature is
concerned to change, then it seems rather surprising that a perspectival
orientation is so readily (and silently) accepted in that literature. In
accepting the perspectival set-ups that the law poses, one begins ones
law reform conversation at the end of a negotiation. The reformer who
looks to the background of context or the interdisciplinary for
answers already accepts that these backgrounds are neatly and
necessarily separable from their legal foreground. S/he aspires, perhaps,
to stand where the sovereign would stand: in a space outside the
messiness of the social, where one knows oneself to be working on the
side of the good. However, to tackle bias embedded in the commonplaces
of law-landscape, I would argue, one gains much from beginning at one
or other place of impurity: points where public/private, law/landscape,
authentic/inauthentic, power/freedom, law/non-law and related
distinctions break down, corroding the smooth glaze of that which
presents itself as non-negotiable. As I have sought to show, the tort of
private nuisance may be one such starting point, among many.

4 Final thoughts:
prospects for troubling the grid
David Delaney has observed, in relation to legal understandings of
nature, that [o]ften, to theorize the legal is to draw boundaries around
it, to mark its limits, to distinguish the interior of law from the extra-legal
To undertake this sort of operation is to create a conceptual or
analytical distance between law, properly speaking, and its mere
contexts, or the ground against which law emerges as a figure (2001:
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78). The common law of nuisance, this article has sought to demonstrate,
depends on such operations for the production of its own legitimacy.
Nuisance law relies, for its legitimacy, upon the capacity (and
propensity) of law to separate itself from the ground of economics and
aesthetics. It relies too (as much legal scholarship does) on the
construction of a private domain (of law, property, subjectivity etc)
repeatedly set apart from the public domain of policy argumentation
and resource allocation. The production of these scenes in turn depends
upon the adherence, by readers and writers of legal texts, to a perspectival
orientation. That orientation permits the naturalisation of conceptual
or analytical distance between law, properly speaking, and its mere
contexts as reality. Perspective engenders individualisation and
monopolisation of the act of seeing within law and fosters the
predominance of an associated subjectivity.
Against this outlook, this article has suggested possibilities for
reading private law generally, and nuisance law in particular, as an area
of law where significant and politically controversial decisions are taken
regarding the constitution of polities, the shaping of landscapes
physical and social, and the allocation of power across them. Moreover,
the mode of reading enacted in this article  reading the surfaces of
nuisance law for pattern and predisposition  resists the layering of
law into legal and non-legal or private and public planes, with the latter
serving as a determinative underlay. Instead, this article has sought to
suggest, the architectural make-up of law (or, per Damisch, its sentence
structure) remains ripe for critical engagement by those concerned
about laws role in concentrating power and resources in relatively few
hands. A key element of this make-up is the perspectival grid through
which prevailing legal ways of seeing are structured (Berger 1972).
Law-landscape relations within the common law cannot be
comprehended except by reference to this paradigm (Damisch 1994).
More importantly for those engaged in critical projects of various stripes,
law-landscape relations within the common law cannot effectively be
disrupted without tackling this perspectival programming.
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Rich potential for critical questioning lies within laws perspectival
program. For, as noted above, embedded within that program is all the
messiness of social exchange: The individual viewpoint that perspective
works to ensconce within legal understandings of landscape is always
unsettled and in the course of reciprocal articulation. The interests and
outlook of the private property holder may be entrenched through the
operation of laws perspectival grid, but that grid also necessitates an
engagement with the viewing actions of others. Perspective enthrones
the viewing subject only insofar as the viewer knows herself to be seen.
Accordingly, far from standing before a background of social context,
law contains the stuff of the social. Far from detaching itself from a
collective background, private law is a publicly negotiated and publicly
negotiable artefact. Recalling this may be a first step towards questioning
the political imperviousness of contemporary private law and the
particular interests that it serves.
More than a decade ago, Damisch proposed an an anamnestic
project designed to recover [perspective] from the technological oblivion
into which it has been plunged (1994: 52). Law too now languishes in a
technical limbo, forever the chorus to a contextual (read social or
economic or aesthetic) main act. Perhaps, then, there is occasion for an
anamnestic project directed at both legal and perspectival technologies:
a concerted forgetting of law-landscape in a perspectival mode, so that
new set-ups might be tried and new windows opened. Before laws
landscapes, [t]he central question [might] then become how  under
what conditions, with what consequences  they are made up (Delaney
2001: 107).
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